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When Legislators Become
Administrators: The Problem of
Plural Office-Holding
Richard A. Hogarty*
INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE ISSUE
An invitation every academic welcomes is the rare opportunity
to grapple effectively with the new realities of modern life in
America. When the invitation includes the application of both the-
ory and practice and the sorting out of power relationships, the ac-
ademic not only welcomes the opportunity, but relishes it. Properly
conceived, the basic task of public policy analysis is to deal in a
timely and practical fashion with pressing public issues of the day.
The focus typically is on "hot" political problems and topics that
are "ripe" for public debate and scrutiny. Clearly the central
theme of this symposium falls into such a category. But the reader
must remember that my conclusions are those of a political scien-
tist, not a constitutional lawyer. To the legal mind, the problem of
plural office-holding and lopsided legislative power may be seen in
a different light.
For purposes of this exploration, I will focus my analysis on
the dynamics of state politics in general, and the intrastate distri-
butions of political power in particular. More specifically, I will ex-
amine the propriety of Rhode Island state legislators and their
designated appointees serving on various public boards and com-
missions and performing what are essentially executive functions.
For the legislators involved this means holding dual positions.
Sooner or later, they will have to vote on appropriations for their
own agency. This institutional arrangement is at best a messy sit-
* Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow, McCormack Institute of
Public Affairs, University of Massachusetts, Boston. An earlier version of this arti-
cle was prepared for delivery at the Roger Williams Law School symposium, Sepa-
ration of Powers in State Constitutional Law on April 25, 1998.
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uation, and at worst a glaring conflict of interest. At a time when
public distrust of government runs high, this dubious practice has
aroused considerable media attention and controversy in Rhode Is-
land. No issue is more contentious or more contradictory. It has
fueled a political fire that would burn with increasing intensity.
Naturally there are conflicting views on the subject. Some ob-
servers see the controversy strictly as a power struggle between
the executive and the legislature.1 Others view it as a political
question, not a constitutional one.2 Still others see it more broadly
as a legal confrontation between "good-government" reformers and
patronage-bent legislators.3 The former represent an alliance of
civic activists protesting the worst abuses of patronage and corrup-
tion, while the latter appear to be a cadre of opportunistic politi-
cians seeking to use their political influence to enhance their power
and personal gain. In political parlance, the practice of simultane-
ously holding legislative office and serving on administrative
boards is derisively known as "double-dipping."4 Whatever the va-
riance in opinions and perceptions, understanding the ways in
which they complement and counteract one another makes the
problem of plural office-holding more comprehensible.
Unquestionably, the intent of the civic-minded reformers is to
force the lawmakers off the numerous administrative boards on
which they serve. The forces of reform have heretofore engaged in
institutional reform litigation to achieve their twin goals of clean-
ing up government and improving the efficiency of public services.
At rock bottom, the conflict has pitted the legislative and executive
branches of state government against each other, and for obvious
reasons. This is because the stakes are so high; they have a great
deal at stake to defend. Each of the three co-ordinate branches,
1. Telephone interview with Elmer E. Cornwell, Professor of Political Science
(Feb. 18, 1998); telephone interview with Maureen Moakley, Professor of Political
Science (Feb. 11, 1998). These scholars have co-authored a forthcoming book on
Rhode Island state government. It should be noted that Elmer Cornwell, a profes-
sor at Brown University, formerly served as the House parliamentarian in the
Rhode Island Legislature.
2. See, e.g., Daniel A. Curran, The General Assembly's Powers: Wrong Closet,
Wrong Broom, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 2, 1997, at B7; telephone interview with Francis
Leazes, Professor of Political Science (Feb. 12, 1998).
3. See Peter B. Lord, General Assembly Under Siege in Historic Challenge,
Prov. J. Bull., Mar. 30, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 6510744.
4. The term "double dipping" generally refers to a state employee who holds
two salaried jobs and is compensated for both of them.
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which includes the judiciary, claims that its own sphere of power is
constitutionally protected.5 Each seeks to defend itself in battles
over turf and jurisdictional boundary lines. The account that fol-
lows is based almost entirely on the historical record.
THE ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT SEPARATION OF POwERS DEBATE
For openers, I take as given the constitutional legitimacy of
the separation of powers doctrine.6 I leave to other symposium
participants the legal debate over the "true intentions" of those
who originally drafted and subsequently amended the Rhode Is-
land constitution. The dispute over whether it is proper for the
legislature to appoint its own members to public boards that exer-
cise executive powers is very much a modern debate. The reason is
that since the early 1970s, this relatively recent phenomenon grew
dramatically with the birth of the quasi-public state agency.7
The controversy originated with the passage of the so-called
Brayton Act in 1901, when the legislature first encroached upon
the governor's patronage power to appoint administrative offi-
cials.8 At the time, the Republican-controlled General Assembly
feared that the Democrats might capture the governorship. 9 The
Senate, in a blatant use of power, seized certain appointments for
itself. This allowed the Senate, through its control of over 80
boards and commissions, to formulate and implement Rhode Is-
land's governmental programs and, in effect, run the state. 10
From the time the Republicans took over the reins of govern-
ment from a faltering old aristocracy in 1856, they maintained
political control of the state up until 1932.11 The Democrats con-
trolled the executive branch only eight of the seventy-six years be-
5. See Patrick T. Conley, Separation of Powers in Rhode Island, 44 R.I. B.J. 9
(1995).
6. See R.I. Const. art. V. Furthermore, the people of Rhode Island adopted a
"Bill of Rights" in 1790 which guaranteed a separation of powers in state govern-
ment. See Kevin D. Leitao, Rhode Island's Forgotten Bill of Rights, 1 Roger Wil-
liams U. L. Rev. 31, 45 (1996).
7. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 6, In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
8. See Conley, supra note 5, at 10.
9. See id.; see also Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 51, In re Advisory
Opinion (No. 97-572-M.P.) (explaining the powers of the Rhode Island General
Assembly).
10. See Conley, supra note 5, at 10.
11. See Duane Lockard, New England State Politics 175 (1959).
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tween 1856 and 1932.12 Duane Lockard, a distinguished student
of New England state politics, has traced the origins of the plural
office-holding dispute. 13 It was clearly present at the turn of this
century. In 1901, Charles Brayton was the undisputed Republican
party leader, who ran things in Rhode Island in the oligarchic
manner of the classic party boss. 14 As Lockard explains:
Often boss-ridden and corrupt, the Republican party was the
representative of business interests and rural Yankees. The
career of Rhode Island's most famous boss, General Charles
Brayton, is a gaudy illustration of the kind of power the party
had and how it was used. Brayton, who had been a general in
the Civil War, had been a minor figure in the party with mi-
nor patronage appointments prior to his emergence as party
mogul late in the nineteenth century. Blind during the latter
years of his rule, he nevertheless operated the government of
the state with a sure hand. He had an alliance with powerful
Senator Nelson Aldrich, but in matters of internal politics he
was by and large on his own. Since Brayton occasionally had
trouble with "his" governors, he had a law passed in 1901-
commonly called the Brayton Law-by which the Senate, if it
did not approve of a governor's nomination to any post, could
substitute its own choice for the job. The governor also lacked
the veto power then. Prime authority rested with the legisla-
ture-that is to say, with Brayton.
Brayton's control over the party and the government was re-
inforced in two ways. He had the support of the big money in
the state and he had a faithful organization with which to
discipline the recalcitrant. According to Lincoln Steffens,
Brayton controlled legislators by advancing them "to judge-
ships and other political jobs, threw them law business and, if
they were not lawyers, contracts and other business. He had
pull enough to get men jobs with his client corporations." If
his orders were disobeyed, the "word" would be passed down
and only rarely would the offender be able to withstand the
disciplinary action. As "counsel" to such corporations as the
New Haven and Hartford Railroad, the Rhode Island Com-
pany (street railways), the Providence Telephone Company,
and other such large corporations wanting favors from the
state, Brayton had ample money with which to work. Cash
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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was put to work in a most undignified manner in elections. It
bought votes. 15
But that was only the start of a pattern of behavior that would
become all too familiar in the coming years. The Republicans con-
tinued to use the Brayton Law to keep their own supporters in ad-
ministrative positions. 16 Hence, they were able to frustrate the
efforts of Democratic Governor Theodore F. Green, who came to
power in 1932 at the height of the Great Depression. 17 Lockard
noted that allowing the governor's nominations to lay idle for three
days enabled the Senate to override the governor's suggestions and
appoint whomever it pleased to any position.1s The result was that
administrative and judicial positions went mostly to
Republicans.' 9
Once the Democrats gained power, they quickly retaliated. In
the election of 1934, they not only returned Governor Green to of-
fice, but they also captured both houses of the legislature. 20 With a
clean sweep, the Democrats staged what became known as the
"Bloodless Revolution."2 ' They repealed the Brayton Law, abol-
ished several boards and commissions, and enacted a statute that
gave the governor budgetary power.22 As Lockard elaborates:
With a clear majority thus assured, the Senate then con-
curred with the House in the removal of all members of the
Supreme Court, all of them Republicans. (No Democrat had
served on that bench for sixty three years!) A new court was
promptly appointed consisting of three Democrats and two
Republicans. Then within minutes many state boards and
commissions were abolished, and some eighty governmental
units were reorganized into eleven departments under con-
trol of the governor. There being no Civil Service Law Protec-
tion, the consequences for officeholding Republicans were
what one might expect. Few survived the house-cleaning
operation.23
15. Id. at 175-76 (citation omitted).
16. See id. at 191.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 192.
21. Conley, supra note 5, at 10.
22. See id.
23. Lockard, supra note 11, at 192 (citation omitted).
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The Republicans recaptured the governorship in 1938.24
Though defeated in the General Assembly, Republican Governor
William H. Vanderbilt, of the famous Vanderbilt clan, sought to
eliminate dual-job holding by adamantly refusing to appoint legis-
lators to salaried jobs.25 But as time went on, this practice became
increasingly prevalent in the mid-1950s, with the creation of the
Retirement Board.26 Joseph Larisa, Governor Almond's legal
counsel, recalled that the Bloodless Revolution of 1935 may have
restored some of the Governor's appointment power; however, the
General Assembly's "impetuous vortex" began drawing more and
more forcefully. 27 The General Assembly's practice of appointing
legislators to public boards commenced in 1955, and its member-
ship has increased through the present day.28
As the latest figures reveal, the legislature currently makes
more than 300 appointments to more than seventy-five public
boards. 29 Of these, more than 200 are sitting legislators and their
vested interests show.30 Furthermore, an additional 100 legisla-
tive appointees sit on these boards.31 For whatever reasons, the
scope of the problem has not always been accurately documented.
Suffice it to say that the inevitable consequences are both intrusive
and damaging to the processes of executive decision-making and
program execution. No other state in the nation permits such ex-
tensive legislative incursion into the executive branch.32 Of the
few states that resort to interbranch appointments, Rhode Island
is perhaps the most notorious. As one observer remarked, "[nlo
other state in this nation tolerates legislative intrusion into the ex-
ecutive branch of this nature and to this extent."3 3 The media,
both print and electronic, portrays this situation as a long-stand-
ing public problem that heretofore has been considered intracta-
24. See id. at 185.
25. , See id. at 186.
26. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 10, In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
27. See id. (quoting the Federalist No. 48, at 332 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 6.
30. See id. at 6-7.
31. See Brief of the Amici Curiae Common Cause of Rhode Island et al., at 1,
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
32. See id.
33. Id.
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ble.34 With a recurrent pattern of such political behavior, it
naturally yields an expectation that things will continue as before.
Practice in this case does not square with theory; the excesses raise
the specter of corruption.
LEGIsLATIvE DOMINANCE vERsus EXECuTvE CONTROL
No other branch dominates the operations of Rhode Island
state government more than the legislature. 35 It has enormous au-
thority and exercises pervasive influence in state politics. Neither
the executive, the courts, nor the bureaucracy possess the kind of
concentrated power of the legislature. This august legislative body
is perceived by the general public to be the dominant power broker
in the state. "Perceived power"-as most political science text-
books indicate-"is real power, even if it is blue smoke and mir-
rors."36 To be sure, legislative dominance lies at the heart of the
problem. For quite fundamentally that is what the separation of
powers fight is all about: can a seemingly all-powerful legislature
assert the dual claim of having the power both to enact and enforce
the laws? The answer to this question is simply no. The legisla-
ture can certainly enact the laws, but it is not authorized by the
constitution to enforce them.3 7 The latter is strictly an executive
prerogative. 38 For as the Rhode Island constitution clearly states,
the executive power is vested in the governor.39 Hence, the usur-
pation of the enforcement function by the legislature is an egre-
gious violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Acknowledging its doubtful legality, one must ask the obvious
questions. Does the doctrine of separation of powers prohibit the
legislature from appointing individuals to offices outside the legis-
lative branch? What are the political consequences when legisla-
tors become administrators? Does their plural office-holding
amount to a conflict of interest? Should legislators, who decide
how the public purse is spent, also determine how public agencies
conduct their operations? Is the public interest served when legis-
34. See, e.g., Russell Garland, Almond, Legislators Square off in Court Case,
Prov. J. Bull., Dec. 28, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 17531644.
35. See Conley, supra note 5, at 9-10.
36. Remedial Law 28 (Robert Wood ed., 1990).
37. See R.I. Const. art. VI, § 2.
38. See id. art. IX, § 1.
39. See id.
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lators appropriate money for the public boards on which they
serve? Does their infiltration of these agencies constitute an abuse
of the governor's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws?
Does this phenomenon diminish his or her effectiveness as the
political chief executive? Is it a prescription for executive impo-
tency? What about the democratic theory of accountability for the
administration of public agencies funded by citizens with public
funds? Does the blurring of boundary lines between the legislative
and executive branches undermine that accountability? What does
all of this have to say about the principle of executive control? My
list of questions is far from complete. Many other questions may
need to be asked and answered, but this approach at least helps us
to sharpen our focus.
CONSENSUS BUILDING AND THE EMERGING CONSENSUS
These questions of public policy and public management and
their ramifications have been debated with increasing fervor in
Rhode Island.40 Several watchdog groups and prominent public
figures have spearheaded the effort to jump-start a response to a
perceived public need for resolving the public dispute.41 Their
political activity provides an important source of civic engagement
and commitment. John Kingdon perceptively points out:
In the policy stream, consensus is built largely through the
processes of persuasion and diffusion. If an idea survives
scrutiny according to a set of criteria for survival, it diffuses
within the policy community. There is also consensus build-
ing in the political stream. However, the processes which set
bandwagons in motion are radically different in the two
streams. In contrast to the policy stream's emphasis on per-
suasion, the political stream's consensus building is governed
by bargaining. 42
To his credit, Sheldon Whitehouse has played a key role in
bringing the issue to light and putting it on the public agenda.43
40. See Peter Phipps, Is King Charles to Blame for Political Corruption in
Rhode Island?, Prov. J. Bull., Dec. 14, 1997, at Fl, available in 1997 WL 13874205.
41. See Lord, supra note 3, at Al.
42. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies 159 (2d ed.
1995) (citation omitted).
43. See Sheldon Whitehouse, Appointments by the Legislature Under the
Rhode Island Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of the Road Less Trav-
eled, 1 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 1, 14-28 (1996).
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Whitehouse, the former United States Attorney for Rhode Island,
has fully grasped the stakes. He has found political company and
support from civic activists and elected officials from a variety of
positions and perspectives. The most politically visible and influ-
ential include Common Cause, the Environmental Council of
Rhode Island, the State Council of Churches, Red Alert, the
League of Women Voters and Operation Clean Government. These
watchdog groups see a troubling pattern of behavior on the part of
legislators.44 They have highlighted the deleterious effects of legis-
lative infiltration and intrusion upon the executive branch. As
journalist Peter Lord writes, "[aill paint a bleak picture of legisla-
tive interference, conflicts of interest and poor decision-making."45
In a contentious world, trying to achieve a consensus on the
issue has not been easy. Common Cause, the League of Women
Voters and Red Alert, Inc. have taken lead positions, claiming
there is an inherent conflict of interest when the people who write
the law are the same people who administer it.46 These public ad-
vocacy groups have enhanced public awareness of the problem and
demanded reform.47 The reformers have been able to effect a loose
alliance among their divergent forces; this alliance has included
important interest groups as well as some of the most influential
members of the bar.48
Amid this flurry of activity, the outlines of the legislative-exec-
utive struggle for control of the bureaucracy have taken shape.
Not surprisingly, the Democratic legislators have fiercely resisted
the objectives of their reform-minded opponents. The question of
whether legislative appointments contravene the state constitu-
tion has been brought before the Rhode Island Supreme Court
twice within the past 12 years. 49 Getting its act together on this
issue has proved difficult for the judiciary. In 1986, Superior Court
Judge Ronald Lagueux ruled that the legislative appointments to
the Coastal Resources Management Council were unconstitu-
tional.50 On appeal, however, the state's high court unanimously
44. See Lord, supra note 3, at Al.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See, e.g., id.
49. See Garland, supra note 34, at Al.
50. See id.
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overturned Lagueux's decision.51 It managed to sidestep the con-
stitutional issue by ruling that the trial judge did not have the
power to review the constitutionality of the statute.52 A similar
fate befell the reformers in 1996 when they attempted to obtain a
more definitive judgment. 53 By a vote of 2 to 2, with one vacancy
existing on the high court, the justices divided evenly on the consti-
tutional question.54 The problems inherent in the wording of the
opinion became painfully apparent in their split decision. This tie
vote resulted in a "presumption of constitutionality" that in effect
preserved the status quo.55 Despite the court's indecisiveness, the
seeds of the conflict had been sown and had taken root.
ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH
And this is but a part of the story. It helps explain the tortu-
ous path of the institutional reform litigation, where the main ad-
vocates seem to share the same philosophical stance. Although the
reformers lost the first two skirmishes, they have persisted in their
efforts to achieve genuine institutional change. Indeed, they have
not wavered in that singular purpose. Those who watched these
events unfold could have foreseen that the two great laws of timing
and momentum were moving in their direction. It has taken
awhile to get the focus back, but now it is happening. In hindsight,
the two previous legal battles were only warm-ups for the main
event, setting the stage for what followed.
Initially rebuffed by the courts, the reformers are still trying to
find a feasible solution. On May 5, 1997, the state Ethics Commis-
sion fashioned a new strategy for implementing such change. 56
Whatever the inspiration, it concluded that when members of the
General Assembly make appointments, a conflict of interest
arises. 57 Acting pursuant to its constitutional power under Article
51. See id.
52. See Easton's Point Ass'n v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 522
A.2d 199, 202 (R.I. 1987).
53. See In re Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, 670 A.2d 1232
(R.I. 1996).
54. See id. at 1233.
55. Id.
56. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 1-2, In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.) (referring to the Letter
from Gov. Almond to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, November 20, 1997).
57. See id. at 1.
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III, Section 858 the Ethics Commission promulgated an adminis-
trative ruling that prohibits lawmakers and their appointees from
serving on administrative boards and commissions that exercise
executive powers. 59 This ruling (Regulation #36-14-5014) is sched-
uled to go into effect on July 1, 1999.60
Whatever its merits, this strategy has stirred the embers of
the controversy and reopened the constitutional question. On No-
vember 20, 1997, Governor Almond asked the state Supreme Court
for an advisory opinion with regard to its constitutionality.61 Once
again, the judiciary finds itself at the eye of the storm. The anti-
legislative forces have only lost a little time; and if the high court
rules in their favor, this may turn out to have been no real loss at
all.
RESOLVING BOUNDARY DISPUTES
As a point of departure, it is important to acknowledge that all
political systems have boundaries within which they operate.
These boundaries greatly influence what actions occur in the polit-
ical arena. They are never entirely constant or stable. Thus the
tension is continuing. Some of the conflict that is normal in a polit-
ical system is the struggle to maintain, extend or retract the
boundaries of the system. In this context, the ongoing controversy
in Rhode Island strikes me as being analogous to a border skir-
mish. Robert Wood explains, "[blorder wars can find acceptable
resolution, be accidentally begun and ended, or be intolerable and
completely destructive. In no instance, however, do they yield to
pure reason."62 Values and vested interests are at stake as well as
pride and ambition. Power intoxicates people; it is never volunta-
rily surrendered.
This is especially true in a state like Rhode Island where the
legislature has reigned supreme as the dominant political institu-
58. This section of the Rhode Island Constitution of 1986 gives the Ethics
Commission the authority to prohibit conflicts of interest.
59. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 1-2. In re Advisory Opinion
(No. 97-572-M.P.).
60. See id. at 2.
61. See id. at 2-3.
62. Robert Wood, The Participant Observer and the Observant Participant 8
(1988) (unpublished paper delivered at the 1988 American Political Science Associ-
ation Conference) (on file with the American Political Science Association in Wash-
ington, D.C.).
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tion for more than three centuries.63 At the root of the problem
then are quite different conceptions of the political system. On the
one hand, observing political life suggests that political systems
are very complex, involving history, culture, personalities, institu-
tional arrangements, special interests, ethnicity and participation.
On the other hand, state constitutional politics involves both is-
sues peculiar to particular states and common concerns that arise
periodically in state after state. Alan Tarr, who has written exten-
sively on the subject, identifies three recurring issues in state
constitutional politics: (1) the intrastate distribution of political
power; (2) the scope of government activity; and (3) the relation of
state government to economic activity.6 4
THREE PARADIGMS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
A constitution is supposed to be a succinct document establish-
ing a government's structure and its limitations of power.65 Amer-
icans tend to trust that the distribution of government will produce
"good government."66 Our tendency to revere constitutional docu-
ments sometimes leads us to overlook one important fact about
them. They not only provide the basic rules about how politics is to
be conducted in a given state, but they also affect the locus of
power.
Alan Tarr identifies three theories that help to explain the dy-
namics of state constitutional politics and constitutional change. 67
First, some scholars subscribe to the "political-culture" model es-
poused by Daniel Elazar.6s They look at state constitutions as em-
bodiments of a particular state's political culture because they find
dominant political forces use their state's constitution to promote
their own values.69 The reasoning is that the state's constitution
should follow the changing political culture.70 Second, other schol-
ars have proposed what might be called the "historical-movement"
63. See Conley, supra note 5, at 9.
64. See G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical Perspective,
in Constitutional Politics in the States 3, 5-16 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996).
65. See Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government 84 (2d ed.
1969).
66. Id. at 81.
67. See Tarr, supra note 64, at 4.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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model.71 They contend that state constitutions reflect national
political forces dominating at the time the state adopted its consti-
tution rather than the distinct political cultures within the state.72
According to this theory, "[sitate constitutional politics is thus na-
tional politics writ small."7 3 Finally, still another set of scholars
have advanced what is referred to as the "ordinary-politics
model."74 They argue that a state's constitutional politics are
merely reflections of the state's political decisions in other areas. 75
Based on this theory, "the constitution registers the result of group
[interaction and] conflict within the state at the point at which var-
ious provisions were adopted."76
In more than a superficial way each of these paradigms accu-
rately describes many aspects of the Rhode Island political system.
Despite the striking differences of these theories, they tend to over-
lap to some degree. Tarr explains:
The indigenous political forces emphasized by the ordinary-
politics model may well reflect the political culture of the
state or mirror political cleavages found throughout the na-
tion. Moreover, as we shall see, national political develop-
ments can influence the political culture of a state or affect
the fortunes of political forces within it. Finally and most im-
portant, each model may accurately depict an aspect of state
constitutional politics but need integration into a more com-
prehensive and yet more nuanced account. 77
RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
From 1643 to 1842, Rhode Island's government existed under
two written charters. 78 But the power to govern contained in these
charters did not originate from the people.79 Kevin Leitao has
noted:
Although the people played a role in the design of the char-
ters, the British Sovereign was the source of the charters and
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 4-5.
77. Id. at 5.
78. See Leitao, supra note 6, at 35.
79. See id.
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granted certain rights to the people of the colony. The first
charter, obtained in 1643, was a parliamentary patent ...
Following the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the 1643
charter was replaced by a royal charter granted by Charles II
in 1663. The charters established Rhode Island as a corpo-
rate colony. As a corporate colony, the residents of Rhode Is-
land were granted virtual self governance.80
Shortly after the colonies severed their bonds with England,
eleven of the thirteen original states adopted new constitutions.,,
By 1780, Rhode Island and Connecticut were the only states not
governed by a state constitution. They simply revised their char-
ters to encompass their newly proclaimed independence.8 2 Rhode
Islanders relished in their corporate charter, and valued the reli-
gious freedom it guaranteed; therefore, they retained their charter
throughout the American Revolution, and beyond, when the sev-
eral colonies discarded their royal charters for written
constitutions.83
The early state constitutions provide evidence of the political
thinking then prevalent on questions of governmental practice and
institutions.8 4 Concerns of the colonists were heightened because
of the tyranny of their own governors and the vast patronage pow-
ers they possessed.8 5 Constitution writers consistently empha-
sized legislative power because they associated the alleged misuse
of power by the King-their enemy-with the general threat of ex-
ecutive power.86 Also, rivalry between the King's agents-the
[royal] governors-and colonial legislative bodies magnified the
tensions growing between London and the colonies.87 Accordingly,
the prestige of executive authority deteriorated, and the people
feared its misuse.88 The provinces stood on guard against the gov-
ernor's dangerous patronage powers and the corruption of the
legislature.8 9
80. Id. at 35-36.
81. See Lockard, supra note 65, at 70.
82. See id.
83. See Conley, supra note 5, at 9.
84. See Lockard, supra note 65, at 72.
85. See id. at 72 & n.12.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Marc W. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty 116 (1997).
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Separation of powers was very popular at this time, in part
because much of America had read Baron DeMontesquieu's The
Spirit of the Laws.90 However, separation of powers was only a
theoretical concept; in substance, most early state governments ex-
emplified legislative supremacy. 91 Therefore, chief executives only
enjoyed a modicum of independent power. 92 Few governors were
granted veto power; their respective legislatures also exercised
control by electing them.93 Moreover, the legislature often circum-
vented the executive in effecting significant appointments. 94 Lock-
ard argues:
There is thus an anomaly in these early constitutions: they
establish in many instances virtual legislative supremacy
while simultaneously proclaiming the doctrine of separation
of powers. Were they maliciously being misleading? The an-
swer lies in the political realities they faced, the traditions
they knew, and the fact that they-not unlike other genera-
tions of politicians-were able to live with certain contradic-
tions partly because they did not recognize them as such.
There were those who recognized the discrepancy, however,
and-fearing undue legislative authority-complained of the
error. Thomas Jefferson was alarmed at the great power of
the legislature granted by the Virginia constitution.95
Revolutionary activists who supported a constitutional separa-
tion of powers carefully addressed the problems of patronage and
plural office-holding. 96 These activists "were concerned not only
about the magistrate's manipulation of a representative assembly
but also about the concentration of all power in the legislature."97
In his aptly titled book, Between Authority and Liberty, historian
Marc W. Kruman argues:
The fear of executive manipulation of the legislature influ-
enced state constitution makers, but it neither encompassed
what the revolutionaries meant by a separation of powers nor
fully explained their concerns about plural officeholding.
They feared both the magistrate's manipulation of the legisla-
90. See Lockard, supra note 65, at 72.
91. See id. at 73.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 72.
96. See Kruman, supra note 89, at 116.
97. Id.
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ture through patronage and the dangerous accumulation of
both executive and legislative powers in the same hands ....
Convention delegates did not seek merely to prohibit a
man from holding more than one office, they prevented offi-
cials in one branch from also becoming officials in another.
They hoped thereby to avoid concentrations of power in any
one branch of government or any group of men ....
If representatives and executive officials were the same per-
sons, they would pursue their own interests at the expense of
the public's.98
The charter that King Charles II had granted to Rhode Island
in 1663 provided for legislative supremacy, denying the governor
any significant executive power.99 Under the second charter, all
power was vested in the General Assembly, which remained the
dominant political force in state politics.100 For more than a cen-
tury after 1663, the legislature was for all practical purposes the
state government. 10 '
During the first half of the nineteenth century, population
shifts within the thirteen original states fueled conflicts over vot-
ing rights and representation in the state legislatures. 0 2 Because
state legislatures were apportioned by state constitutions, those
unhappy with the political system could only remedy their discon-
tent through constitutional reform.10 3 This discontent of the gov-
erned gave impetus to campaigns for constitutional conventions. 104
When the Rhode Island legislature adamantly refused to sanction
a convention, insurgent elements joined in a rebellion. 105 They de-
98. Id. at 117.
99. See Conley, supra note 5, at 9 ("Constitutionally the governor was scarcely
more than the executive agent of the General Assembly.").
100. See id.
101. See Telephone interview with Elmer E. Cornwell, supra note 1; see also
Elmer Cornwell, Revision of General Assembly History is Error-Filled, Prov. J.
Bull., May 4, 1998, at B5, available in 1998 WL 12183665 (discussing the
supremacy of the Rhode Island Legislature at that time).
102. See Tarr, supra note 64, at 6.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. (referring to the Dorr Rebellion of 1841 and citing Marvin E. Get-
tleman, The Dorr Rebellion (1973)).
1998] THE PROBLEM OF PLURAL OFFICE-HOLDING 149
vised a new constitution and held elections under it.106 For a short
period of time, the state had two rival governments. 0 7
This armed attempt at a coup d'dtat failed, but it incited the
ruling aristocrats to frame a new constitution in 1842.108 The
principle of legislative supremacy was carried over to the new con-
stitution. 10 9 Essentially, its framers put in constitutional form
what was contained in the royal charter. 0 At the time, the gover-
nor's formal role in policy-making was very small; his informal au-
thority depended largely upon his personality and party
strength."' The chief executive lacked both constitutional appoin-
tive power and the veto; he derived most of his power from other
than constitutional sources. 112 After 1843, the governor was rou-
tinely granted statutory power to appoint and remove officers of
his own choosing to and from state boards and commissions.1l 3
During the second half of the nineteenth century, it became cus-
tomary for governors to make administrative appointments. 114 A
few post-Civil War governors became effective party leaders, but
their power still paled by comparison to the legislature. 15
As time went on, fear of the executive gradually waned and
the governor's powers were eventually expanded."16 The rise of
technology robbed life and therefore government of the simplicity
that had previously existed in a pre-urban and pre-industrial soci-
ety. Twentieth century conditions and the complexity of the sub-
jects to be regulated forced the granting of subsidiary rule-making
power to the bureaucracy. 11 7 The complexity of policy invited the
governor to assume the role of public policy leader.1 8 Later on,
the chief executive was given the veto power and greater control
106. See id. at 6.
107. See id.
108, See Lockard, supra note 11, at 174.
109. See Telephone interview with Francis Leazes, supra note 2.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Brief of the Amici Curiae Common Cause of Rhode Island et al., at 23,
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).
114. See id. at 23-24.
115. See Telephone interview with Francis Leazes, supra note 2.
116. See Conley, supra note 5, at 10.
117. See Telephone interview with Francis Leazes, supra note 2.
118. See id.
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over the executive branch. 119 But it was not until as late as 1986
that the Rhode Island governor was given the power to submit a
formal budget. 120 In 1992, his term of office was increased from
two to four years.' 2 ' As it happened, Lincoln Almond was the first
governor to be elected to a four-year term.122
The present constitution has served the state of Rhode Island
for 155 years.' 23 What is evident from this history is that Rhode
Islanders have shown a particular attachment to their constitu-
tions. Even so, they have been willing to amend, revise and revisit
the fundamental law document as frequently as they deem neces-
sary. 124 According to Donald Lutz, there has been a total of 53
amendments to the state constitution.' 25
THE SEPARATION OF POWERs DOCTRINE
The authors of the Federalist papers understood:
[hat the best way of preserving liberty was to divide power.
If power is concentrated in any one place, it can be used to
crush individual liberty. Even in a democracy there can be
the tyranny of the majority, the worst kind of tyranny be-
cause it is so stifling and complete .... Early [American]
federalism was built on the principle of dual sovereignty. The
federal Constitution divided sovereignty between state and
nation, each in control of its own sphere. 126
To further achieve the blessings of liberty, its framers devised
a central government that incorporated the separation of powers
with countervailing checks and balances. 127
The Rhode Island Constitution contains a specific declaration
concerning the separation of powers. 128 Article V declares that
"[tihe powers of the government shall be distributed into three de-
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Donald S. Lutz, Patterns in the Amending of State Constitutions, in
Constitutional Politics in the States, supra note 64, at 24, 33 tbl. 2.1. The base year
for this calculation is 1843, when the first constitution was adopted.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism 6 (1995).
127. See The Federalist Nos. 47, 51 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1982).
128. See R.I. Const. art. V.
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partments: the legislative, executive and judicial."1 29 Alpheus Ma-
son and William Beaney, write:
From this separation of the departments is derived the doc-
trine that certain functions, because of their essential nature,
may properly be exercised by only a particular branch of the
government; that such functions cannot be delegated to any
other branch; and that one department may not interfere
with another by usurping its powers or by supervising their
exercise. 130
At the core of the concept is the notion that the governor and
the legislature are independent of each other, owing their alle-
giance to the electorate. 131
The three branches of government, in their individual func-
tions, endeavor to respond to the needs of their constituencies and
try to resolve public problems.132 The Legislature responds to
their individual constituents; the President represents the "public
will" in general and the courts interpret the laws. 133 In reality,
each institution is highly sensitive to the concerns and pressures of
civic activists, lobbies, interest groups and other intervening
elites.' 34
Clashes between executive and legislative officials constitute
the more difficult grist for the judicial mill. Those who hold power
are usually unwilling to allow those considered to be rivals for
power to sit in judgment on their prerogatives. Not surprisingly,
the primary beneficiaries under the current distribution of political
power are also the most vocal in opposing change.' 3 5 Only grudg-
ingly and under pressure do they yield to piecemeal accommoda-
tion. This is quite a challenge to lay on a judiciary that has not
always been known for its independence.13 6 Up until 1994, state
Supreme Court justices were still elected by the General Assembly
and subject to arbitrary removal by that body.' 3 7 Now they are
129. Id.
130. Alpheus T. Mason & William M. Beaney, American Constitutional Law 52
(3d ed. 1964).
131. See V.0. Key, Jr., American State Politics 52 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972)
(1956).
132. See Robert C. Wood, Whatever Possessed the President? 10 (1993).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See Tarr, supra note 64, at 5.
136. See Garland, supra note 34, at Al.
137. See Conley, supra note 5, at 10.
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appointed by the governor and enjoy life terms under a constitu-
tional amendment approved by the voters in 1994.138
If the political culture is to be confronted, that challenge is
much greater than one might ordinarily think. Judges, of course,
are not free agents. They are constrained by the rules of the judi-
cial proceedings, the nature of the adversary process, appellate re-
view and other restraints. 3 9 Phillip Cooper puts it this way:
The judge is caught up in the law of political interface be-
cause he or she is called upon to perform a kind of unique
task-that is to say, to reconcile demands for rule-of-law con-
cerns, on the one hand, with pragmatic understanding of the
political environment in the year he or she operates, on the
other. 140
Given its prior lack of judicial independence and fear of polit-
ical reprisal, there are some in Rhode Island who are doubtful
about the high court's ability to affect the political culture posi-
tively.141 They think the judges will rule narrowly on the issue
and say that the controversy over legislative appointments is a
political question rather than a constitutional one.142
RHODE ISLAND'S POLITICAL CULTURE
Conventionally, the term "political culture" is defined as the
predominant way people think, feel and believe about a political
system. 143 In other words, it is a collective psychological orienta-
tion toward government structure, incumbents in public office, and
particular policies, decisions, and the enforcement of decisions.
Daniel Elazar has defined it as "the particular pattern of orienta-
tion to political action in which each political system is
embedded." 1'
138. See R.I. Const. art. X, § 4 (amended Nov. 8, 1994).
139. See Remedial Law, supra note 36, at 29.
140. Id.
141. See Interview with Vincent A. Cianci, Jr., Mayor of Providence, Rhode Is-
land, in Boston, Ma. (Apr. 15, 1998).
142. See Curran, supra note 2, at B7.
143. David C. Saffell, State and Local Government 22 (1978).
144. Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States 79 (1966);
see, e.g., Gabriel A. Almond & Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Little, Brown and
Co., 1965) (1963).
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Stephen Bailey and his colleagues observe that Rhode Island
politics do not exemplify the democratic ideal. 145 It is the "product
of years of bitter partisan strife," urban-rural rivalries, religious
and ethnic differences and old class antagonisms. 146 An unyielding
Republican conservatism eventually gave way to a New Deal Dem-
ocratic liberalism, swayed by ethnic and nationality considera-
tions. 147 As all of this might suggest, the political history of Rhode
Island has been tumultuous. To quote Lockard again:
A certain amount of bitterness in the politics of any of our
states can be anticipated, but bitterness backed up with
nearly or actually rebellious force is hardly customary. Yet
such extremes are endemic in Rhode Island policies. True,
there has been only one armed attempt at a coup d'etat-and
that unsuccessful-but near coups and violent wrangling have
characterized the state's politics. Riots, exile, legislative
fistfights, stolen elections, disregard for the spirit and the let-
ter of the constitution-all these and more have been features
of Rhode Island's political history. 148
Over the past several decades, race track lobbies, legislative
corruption and suspicious election day strategems have depicted
Rhode Island politics. 149 Despite these blemishes, the Rhode
Island political system embodies the principles of structure, se-
quence and simplicity. 50 Cumulatively, even these small discov-
eries become important properties in describing a political process,
its texture and context, and in forecasting its evolution.
The state's small geographical size is another important char-
acteristic.' 5 ' While "Little Rhody" is the smallest state in the na-
tion, it is the second most densely populated state with slightly
under one million inhabitants. 152 This fact makes personal and
official contact with politicians easy and somewhat frequent.153
Legislators drive no more than an hour to arrive at the State
145. See Stephen K. Bailey et al., Schoolmen and Politics 82 (1962).
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Lockard, supra note 11, at 190.
149. See Bailey, supra note 145, at 82.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See Maureen Moakley, Political Parties in Rhode Island: Back to the Fu-
ture, in Parties and Politics in the New England States 95 (Jerome M. Miller ed.,
1997).
153. See Bailey, supra note 145, at 82.
154 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:133
House.154 Campaigning to "blanket the grass roots" cannot extend
more than forty miles from the capital city of Providence without
traversing the state line. 155 Bailey observes:
The 100-member House in the General Assembly and the 44-
member Senate are the smallest in New England, and mem-
bers come quickly to know one another. The ease of commu-
nication-between interest group and official, . . . and the
familiarity in which each refers to the other-is further
bound by the metropolitan magnet of Providence. In three
office buildings-the Hospital Trust, the Industrial Trust
[Fleet Bank] and the Turks Head-within a three-block ra-
dius are housed the offices of almost all important law firms
and hence important political figures in the state.156
WHAT Is TO BE DoNE?
Now that Rhode Island faces the ultimate question, what
should it do? Several courses of action are open presumably; what
specifically should be done will depend in large measure on what
the Rhode Island Supreme Court says when it issues its advisory
opinion. As Sheldon Whitehouse sees it:
The court has three basic choices under the state constitu-
tion: It can say the constitution forbids legislative appoint-
ments; it can say that the constitution neither forbids nor
requires such appointments; or it can say that appointments
to office are legislative duties so "usual or ordinary" that the
constitution requires the legislature to perform them.157
Whitehouse, in reviewing other cases, concludes:
Given that almost every other court in the country finds legis-
lative appointments outright forbidden by American constitu-
tions, it seems unlikely the court would follow the third
course. If the court follows the first course, the ethics regula-
tions are moot and void. But if the court follows the second
course, it leaves the area open to regulation by the Ethics
Commission, expanding the commission's realm of
authority.'58
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Sheldon Whitehouse, The Case Against the Legislature, Prov. J. Bull., Apr.
5, 1998, at C14.
158. Id.
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While my purpose here today is not to suggest what the high
court should do, it is my intent to endorse the approach taken by
the state Ethics Commission. I do so on grounds of both feasibility
and desirability about which road to follow. Undeniably simplistic,
the ethics regulations are designed to curb patronage and corrup-
tion by eliminating plural office-holding and political conflicts of
interest. 159 Professionalism, resources and motivation are not un-
related. The central provisions of the administrative ruling are
logical and linked. They seem to support the juncture of good the-
ory and good practice. The policy initiative of the state Ethics
Commission is "an idea in good currency," as they say.' 60 The
same cannot be said of legislative appointments. Put in prohibitive
terms, interbranch appointments do more harm than good; as such
they are incompatible with the public interest. Worse yet, they
raise the specter of corruption and arbitrary power. Joseph Larisa
argues that the General Assembly's custom of appointing its own
members on public boards "makes a mockery of separation of pow-
ers."161 I wholeheartedly agree with him.
The prime justification lawmakers offer for making such ap-
pointments is that they enable them to exercise direct oversight of
the executive branch. 162 This is a spurious argument, mainly be-
cause it completely overlooks the fact that they already possess the
means for doing so. They can exert powerful oversight through
public hearings, legislative investigations, appropriations and au-
thorization legislation. 63 A strong measure of irony attaches to
the fact that legislative oversight of agencies with legislative ap-
159. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 1-2, In re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.) (referring to Letter from
Gov. Almond to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, November 20, 1997).
160. Telephone interview with Frank Grad, Professor at Columbia Law School
(Feb. 23, 1998).
161. Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 50, In re Advisory Opinion (No. 97-
572-M.P.).
162. See Garland, supra note 34, at Al. As the introduction to this symposium
indicates: "Some argue that legislative participation in the enforcement of the law
helps to ensure that regulatory agencies enforce the law in a manner consistent
with the public policy. Others contend that it destroys the checks and balances
necessary to prevent power from being misused." Carl T. Bogus, Introduction to
Symposium: Separation of Powers in State Constitutional Law, 4 Roger Williams
U. L. Rev. 1 (1998) (citations omitted).
163. See id.
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pointees seldom if ever occurs.164 Not coincidentally, these are the
same agencies that are the most prone to scandal. 165 The evidence
is suggestive, but not conclusive. Meanwhile, the beleaguered De-
partment of Environmental Management has been subjected to in-
tensive legislative investigation.1 66
There are those who claim that the legislature has always
been dominant, that the people have accepted this tradition, and
that interference with the will of the people defeats another demo-
cratic principle. 167 But tradition does not offer much support for
plural office-holding-for several reasons. In the first place, it does
not take account of the fact that the legislature has slipped in pub-
lic esteem in part because it has fallen into scandal and disgrace.
It is also questionable whether the people have done anything
more than accept a fait accompli in their "acceptance" of the status
quo. Surely it is fallacious to maintain, as some do, that the people
rejected the idea of separation of powers when they ratified the
1986 constitutional amendments.
Another argument offered in defense of the status quo is that
state legislators have "plenary" powers-that is to say, their power
to legislate is circumscribed only by the grants of power to the fed-
eral government and by limitations found in the federal Constitu-
tion or in their own constitutions. 16 Congress has limited powers
vis-a-vis the states because of principles of American federal-
ism.169 The Founding Fathers gave some areas to Congress to reg-
ulate, and left the rest to state regulation. 170 Where Congress's
power is plenary, it is nevertheless restrained by the principles of
separation of powers. 171 The authority of state legislatures in ar-
eas not preempted by Congress, though plenary, must still be exer-
cised within the constitutional process of government, whose most
vaunted tenet is separation of powers. 172 The point is that the
164. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond at 50, In re Advisory Opinion
(No. 97-572-M.P.).
165. See id.
166. See Peter Phipps, Assembly's DEM Joust Nothing but Power Play, Prov. J.
Bull., Mar. 1, 1998, at D1, available in 1998 WL 6505846.
167. See Curran, supra note 2, at B7.
168. See the discussion in Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Cases
and Materials 691-92 (2d ed. 1993) (citations omitted).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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General Assembly cannot exercise even plenary authority by
usurping other powers.
However the issue of legislative appointments is resolved, one
final dimension of the dispute requires commentary. There are
some who apparently feel that the reform proposal under consider-
ation is a hopeless utopian dream. 173 But they are just plain
wrong. This reform holds out hope for restoring and reinvigorating
state government, if the right coalition of elites, buttressed by a
committed and discerning citizenry, join together in the effort.
Before we can restore public confidence in the public realm, how-
ever, we must first restore competence in government.
The reform movement in Rhode Island has taken place simul-
taneously with a sea of change in American politics and its social
structure. It comes at a time, when responsibility for a wide range
of governmental activity is shifting from Washington to the states.
In a new age of devolution, the ground rules of our political behav-
ior and the characteristics of our polity are likewise shifting. Fed-
eral devolution has shifted the focus of programmatic efforts to the
state and local governments, creating heightened expectations in
the community. The role of the states in keeping the peace, help-
ing prosperity and ensuring justice is critical. The programs to be
carried out are increasingly complex and sophisticated. All of
which requires greater managerial competence, not less. One can-
not expect executive agencies to improve their performance with-
out taking that sea of change into account.
In the final analysis, the test of a state constitution is how it
functions. Professor Frank Grad of Columbia Law School ob-
serves: "The least we may demand of our state constitutions is that
they interpose no obstacle to the necessary exercise of state powers
in response to state residents' real needs and active demands for
service."174 Whether or not the Rhode Island Constitution meets
this minimum test is a question that only the state Supreme Court
can answer. With its newly-won judicial independence in 1994,
which is now based on the merit selection of judges, 175 the court
itself is at a historic turning point. No longer can the judiciary
afford to evade or sidestep the problem of plural office-holding.
173. See Curran, supra note 2, at B7.
174. Robert F. Williams, The New Jersey State Constitution: A Reference
Guide 20 (1990) (citation omitted).
175. See R.I. Const. art. X, § 4 (amended Nov. 8, 1994).

